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Standing, Ripeness And Bureaucratic Inertia
Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin'
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has taken a significant step toward relaxing some of the traditional
barriers to judicial review of administrative decisions. In Environ-
-mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin' the court broadened the applica-
tion of the concepts of standing, ripeness, and reviewability to allow
"consumers of the environment" to challenge executive decisions. This
was, apparently, the first of a series of suits instituted by the Environ-
mental Defense Fund (hereinafter E.D.F.) and others to compel govern-
mental action to prevent despoilation of the environment resulting from
the use of pesticides.' The E.D.F. had sought to have the Secretary of
Agriculture drastically restrict sales of all DDT products, claiming that
it was his obligation under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act4 to do so. The Department of Agriculture had, until this
time, consistently failed to exercise its authority to remove dangerous
pesticides from interstate commerce despite numerous studies 5 which
had shown DDT6 to be carcinogenic, persistent in the environment, and
a threat to the ecology. Although the court did not consider the sub-
stantive issue of the case - whether DDT should in fact be removed
from interstate commerce - the fact that it recognized the right of
the E.D.F. to challenge the Secretary's inaction will undoubtedly be
of great influence in subsequent cases involving such challenges. It
is the purpose of this note to examine Environmental Defense Fund
in light of existing jurisdictional law in order to determine the full
import of the decision.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL SUIT
A. The Statute
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (here-
inafter FIFRA) was enacted in 1947' primarily to protect the public
from harmful effects resulting from the unfettered use of economic
poisons, i.e., mixtures or compounds intended to prevent or destroy
1. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
2. Id.
3. Other environmental suits filed since Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Hardin include Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1083
(D.C. Cir. 1970) ; Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
4. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135 et seq. (1964).
5. E.g., President's Science Advisory Comm., Use of Pesticides (May 15, 1963)
Comm. of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on Pesticides and Their
Relationship to Environmental Health (November, 1969) (Mrak Report).
6. "DDT" is an abbreviation of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane.
7. Act of June 25, 1947, Ch. 125, 61 Stat. 172 (1947), as amended 7 U.S.C.
§ 135 (1964).
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insects, rodents, or fungi.' The Act requires the producer or manu-
facturer of such a substance to label it in accordance with certain
standards and to register it with the Department of Agriculture as
a condition to its sale in interstate commerce.9 A poison which fails
to comply with the labelling requirements or one which would be
unsafe regardless of labelling is considered to be "misbranded"'" and
cannot be registered. Under the original Act, once a product was
registered the Secretary of Agriculture's" only sanction, if a product
subsequently became "misbranded," was to protest its registration. 2
The registration could be cancelled after five years had elapsed from
the date of registration; until that time, the product could remain
on the market.'
3
After extended hearings, FIFRA was amended in 1964 to afford
greater protection to the public. Eliminating the provisions for protest
registration, 4 the 1964 amendments obligate the Secretary to issue
notices of cancellation if he finds that products are misbranded. The
amendments also provide for a comprehensive system of administrative
and judicial review for dissatisfied registrants.' 5 A notice of can-
cellation becomes effective within thirty days unless the registrant
makes the requisite corrections to the label or initiates the review
procedure.' 6 Since the litigation of contestations of cancellation notices
may be protracted, 17 the amendments also provide that "the Secretary
may, when he finds that such action is necessary to prevent an imminent
hazard to the public . . . suspend the registration of an economic
poison ... ."s A suspension order, which in effect forbids further
sale of the product, triggers an expedited review procedure. 9 The
amendments also provide that the decision of the Secretary as to the
8. 7 U.S.C. § 135a (1964).
9. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(a) (1964). If a producer or manufacturer violates the Act,
he can be declared guilty of a misdemeanor and fined a maximum of $500. 7 U.S.C.
§ 135f (1964).
10. Ch. 125, § 2u(2) (d), 61 Stat. 165 (1947), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 135
(z) (2) (d) (1964). See 7 C.F.R. § 2762.11(k) (1970) (registration) which provides:
"The Director may refuse to register any economic poison or any specific use thereof
if, in his opinion, directions and warnings cannot be written which will prevent
injury to the general public when the product is used in accordance with warnings
and directions or in accordance with commonly recognized practices."
11. The functions of the Secretary of Agriculture under FIFRA were trans-
ferred to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 2(8) (i), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2997-98, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Consequently, the rehearing of Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hardin bears the case name Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
12. Act of June 25, 1947, Ch. 125, § 4c, 61 Stat. 168.
13. Id.
14. 7 U.S.C. § 135a et seq. (1964). For the legislative history, see H.R. REP.
No. 1125, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
15. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964).
16. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964) provides for a complicated scheme of review by the
advisory committee, an optional public hearing, and a final order by the Secretary.
17. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964). The length of an average cancellation pro-
ceeding is a matter of speculation. According to a recent congressional investigation,
the Department of Agriculture has "never secured cancellation of a registration in
a contested case." Deficiencies in Administration of Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act, H.R. REP. No. 268, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1969).
18. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964).
19. Id.
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hazardous nature of a poison is presumed to have been correct, thus
placing the burden of showing otherwise on the contesting party.
20
Judicial review is available for both cancellation and suspension
orders. Section 4b(d) provides, "In a case of actual controversy as
to the validity of any order under this section, any person who will be
adversely affected . . . may obtain judicial review . . . in the United
States court of appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or
has his principal place of business, or in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
B. The Background
On October 31, 1969, the Environmental Defense Fund and five
other non-profit organizations 22 petitioned the Secretary of Agriculture
to (1) issue notices of cancellation for all economic poisons containing
DDT and (2) suspend the registration of all DDT products pending
the conclusion of cancellation proceedings. This petition seems to have
been part of an overall plan to prevent the future distribution and
sale of DDT products.2 ' The E.D.F. contended that DDT products
had been shown to be "an imminent hazard to the public"2 4 and to
be misbranded and that, therefore, FIFRA required the Secretary to
initiate proceedings to limit their use in commerce. The petitioners
reasoned that continued registration of these products would be in
complete contravention of the purpose of the amended Act. 5
On November 20, 1969, the Pesticides Regulation Division of
the Department of Agriculture, charged with enforcing FIFRA, issued
notices of cancellation of DDT products registered for certain uses.26
In addition, the Secretary announced that he was considering cancella-
tion of DDT products registered for all uses "unless it can be shown
that certain uses are essential in the protection of human health and
welfare and only those uses for which there are no effective and safe
substitutes for the intended use will be continued. ' 27 The Secretary
20. According to USDA regulations: "At the hearing, the person whose objec-
tions raised the issues to be determined shall be . . . the proponent of the order
sought, and accordingly shall proceed first at the hearing and have the burden of
proof." 7 C.F.R. § 2764.28 (1970). Since § 135b(c) provides that the hearing shall
be held upon the objections raised by the applicant or registrant, the burden of proof
is on that party.
21. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1964).
22. The petitioners included the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., the Sierra
Club, West Michigan Environmental Action Council, and the National Audubon
Society. The D.C. Circuit later granted leave to intervene to the Isaak Walton
League of America. Hereinafter, "E.D.F." will be used to refer to all petitioners.
23. In October, 1969, E.D.F. and six individuals petitioned the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare to repeal tolerances for DDT on agricultural com-
modities under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.
(1964). This act makes unlawful interstate shipment of food products bearing
residues of a pesticide for which a zero tolerance has been established. Id. § 346a(b).
24. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
25. Petitioner argued that continued registration violated the following pro-
visions of FIFRA: 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c), § 135(2)(z)(2)(c), § 135(2)(z)(2)(d),
§ 135(2) (z) (2) (g) (1964). Brief for Petitioners at 17-18 App.
26. 34 FED. REG. 18827 (1969). The Secretary cancelled registration on (1) all
uses on shade trees, (2) all uses on tobacco, (3) all uses in and around the home,
and (4) all uses in aquatic environments, marshes, or wetlands with exceptions.
27. Id.
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requested that all interested persons submit written data, views, or
arguments within ninety days. This initial action by the Secretary
was taken ostensibly as a result of information obtained from three
major fact-finding efforts ;28 the report of the most recent of such
studies, published in November, 1969, by the Commission of the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on Pesticides and Their
Relationship to Environmental Health (and known as the Mrak
Report) recommended that all uses of DDT be eliminated except
where essential to protect human health and welfare.29 Pressure from
public lobby groups such as the E.D.F. may have been partially re-
sponsible for this action by the Secretary.
On December 11, 1969, the Director of Science and Education
for the Department of Agriculture answered the petition in a letter to
the attorney for the E.D.F., wherein he expressed the Department's
concern for the hazards of DDT and listed the steps which the Secre-
tary had recently taken to eliminate them.30 The Director concluded
that these steps, along with some contemplated future action, were
"responsive" to the petition. The E.D.F., considering the Secretary's
steps to be merely token action, viewed the letter as being tantamount
to a refusal by the Secretary to act on the petition and on the basis of
this assumption subsequently sought judicial review of his decision.
After suit was filed by the petitioners in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia,3 the Secretary moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In denying this motion,3 2
the court ruled that the E.D.F. and the other petitioners were "adversely
affected" by the presence of DDT in the environment and that they,
therefore, had standing to challenge the Secretary's failure to restrict
its use.33 The court also concluded that the actions of the Secretary
were reviewable despite the discretionary language of the statute, 4
reasoning that judicial review is precluded only where there is clear
legislative intent to do so, 5 and that no such intent to preclude review is
apparent in the case of decisions made by the Secretary under FIFRA.
The court's acceptance of jurisdiction was in spite of the Secre-
tary's attempt to bifurcate review between the appellate and district
courts.36 In answer to the Secretary's assertion that the appellate court
was not the proper forum for review of the Secretary's action, the
28. Comm'n of Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on Pesticides and
Their Relationship to Environmental Health (Nov. 1969) ; Report of a Comm. of
the Nat'l Research Council (May 1969) ; Report of President's Science Advisory
Comm. (May 15, 1963). See Brief for Petitioners at 5.
29. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Report of the Secretary's
Commission on Pesticides and Their Relationship to Environmental Health (Dec.
1969).
30. Brief for Petitioners at 34 App.
31. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) provides that the Circuit Court of Appeals where a
petitioner resides or the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia shall have
original jurisdiction.
32. The court retained jurisdiction for thirty days to review the Secretary's
findings. 428 F.2d at 1100. The court again reviewed the order in Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
34. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
35. 428 F.2d at 1098.
36. Id. at 1098-99.
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court replied that although the petition sought relief in the nature
of an order of mandamus, which would ordinarily be heard initially
in a district court, the Court of Appeals was the appropriate forum
for review of final orders issued under FIFRA, because it was pre-
sumptively the proper forum for review of any administrative order
having that finality. 7 To complete its syllogism, the court decided
that the Secretary's inaction on the issue of suspension of registration
was equivalent to a denial and consequently was a final agency action
ripe for review. The court reasoned that "[n]o subsequent action can
sharpen the controversy arising from a decision by the Secretary,"
that the nature of the petitioners' allegations necessitated immediate
action, and that further delay in awaiting a final denial or acquiescence
by the Secretary may cause "injury" to the petitioners.3  On the
issue of the finality of the Secretary's decision on the petitioners' re-
quest for notices of cancellation, the court hesitated to equate the
Secretary's almost complete inaction with a denial of relief, since the
Secretary had "made a few feeble gestures in the direction of com-
pliance with the request. . . ."" Instead the court deferred any decision
on whether petitioner would suffer injury as alleged. The case was
remanded to the Secretary for his decision on whether to issue notice
of the cancellation on the remaining uses or, in the alternative, for
an explanation of his inaction.
40
II. STANDING
The decision in Environmental Defense Fund is significant in that
standing to contest the Secretary's action was granted to a membership
association, i.e., a group organized to promote the interests of its
members.4 The petitioners were no more affected by the Secretary's
decision than were other members of the public; the E.D.F.'s interest
in the Secretary's action differed from that of the man in the street
only because its activities as an organization solely concerned environ-
mental protection.
The court based its decision to find the requisite standing primarily
on its interpretation of the provisions in FIFRA providing for judicial
review and on the legislative history of the Act. The Secretary of
Agriculture had argued that the clause providing that "persons ad-
versely affected" have the right to challenge action taken under the
Act referred only to registrants and applicants for registration.42 In
summarily rejecting this argument, the court noted that an attempt
by the National Agriculture Chemical Association to substitute lan-
guage in FIFRA restricting the right of appeal to applicants and
37. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 358-59 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
38. 428 F.2d at 1098.
39. Id. at 1100.
40. Id.
41. For examples of similarly organized associations that have obtained standing
to litigate on behalf of their members, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)
National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Simonson, 403 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 975 (1969).
42. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1964).
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registrants had been rejected in sub-committee. 3 Reasoning that judi-
cial review was thus made available to all those whose interests
fell within the "zone of interests" protected by FIFRA, the court then
looked to the legislative intent behind the Act to determine the scope
of this "zone." Since the statute had been enacted to benefit and
protect the public,4 4 clearly its "zone of interests" included not only the
economic interests of the registrants but also the interests of the
public in preserving health and safety." The interests of the peti-
tioners, as "consumers of the environment," came directly within the
latter classification. And since the E.D.F. and the other petitioners,
through their "uncontroverted allegations" of interest in environ-
mental control, also had claimed sufficient injury in fact to satisfy the
"case" or "controversy" requirement of article III of the Constitution,4 6
the court ruled that they had standing to challenge the Secretary's action.
The two-pronged test employed in Environmental Defense Fund
was apparently derived from the rule of standing recently formulated
by the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.47 In Data Processing a seller of data
processing services sought to challenge an order of the Comptroller
of the Currency authorizing banks to provide these services to their
customers. The majority in Data Processing held that the plaintiffs
were persons "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute"4 thereby qualifying for standing under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Thus Data Processing created a dual test of
standing. The Data Processing test is met if a petitioner (1) "alleges
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise," and (2) falls "within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."49
The Data Processing Court completely rejected the argument of
the Comptroller, based upon the theory followed by the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, that the petitioners had no standing to
sue because they had not alleged the violation of a "legal interest"; Jus-
tice Douglas, writing for the majority, declared that the issue of stand-
43. 428 F.2d at 1096, citing Hearings on Regulation of Economic Poison, Sub-
committee on Departmental Oversight and Consumer Relations of the Committee
on Agriculture, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-51 (1963).
44. H.R. REP. No. 1125, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See note 14 supra and
accompanying text.
45. 428 F.2d at 1097.
46. Id. Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution states: "The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion . . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors . . . to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party ..
47. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
48. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) provides:
"A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled tojudicial review thereof." The original APA sections will be used in the text herein-
after when possible.
49. 397 U.S. at 152-56. The statute involved is the Bank Service Corporation
Act of 1962, 12 U.S.C. § 1864, § 4 of which provides: "No bank service corporation
may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks."
The Court, after considering the legislative history of this act, interpreted
its purpose broadly and ruled that "§ 4 arguably brings a competitor within the
zone of interests protected by it." 397 U.S. at 156.
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ing must be distinguished from that of whether the petitioner possessed
a "legal interest," which issue involves the merits of a case.5" The
"legal interest" test was defined in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
TVA51 wherein the Court held that standing arose out of the invasion
of a legal right, "one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected again tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which
confers a privilege."5 Although some courts developed other theories
that allowed standing despite the fact that no "legal interest" had
been invaded,53 the specter of the "legal interest" requirement con-
tinued to haunt the law of standing.54 The Data Processing Court's
rejection of the "legal interest" requirement thus represented a signifi-
cant clarification and broadening of the doctrine of standing and allowed
the Environmental Defense Fund court to find standing based on the
allegation by petitioners of injury to their environmental interest.
There was precedent for the repudiation of the "legal interest"
requirement. Previous decisions had questioned its validity. Flast
v. Cohen55 was among the first decisions to divorce the question of
standing from any consideration of whether a "legal right" had been
invaded. In Flast a federal taxpayer was granted standing to contest
the constitutionality of a federal statute appropriating funds for use
in religious schools since he had alleged that this exercise by Congress
of its spending power violated the establishment clause of the Consti-
tution. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren conceived of
standing as an aspect of justiciability which does not concern the merits
of the plaintiff's position. 6 A party has sufficient adverse interest to
create a justiciable "case" or "controversy," and therefore to have
standing, if "there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and
the claim sought to be adjudicated. 51 7  This assertion was founded
on theory developed in Baker v. Carr,"8 wherein the Court held that
whether the plaintiffs possessed standing depended upon whether the
50. 397 U.S. at 153.
51. 306 U.S. 118 (1939) (a private electric company could not challenge
governmental subsidy of competitors through TVA because competition, otherwiselawful, does not constitute the invasion of a legal right). Although the legal interest
test was initially enunciated in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) and
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938), Tennessee Electric Power Co.
v. TVA was the first to define its scope.
52. Id. at 137-38.
53. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940)
Associated Industries of New York, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943),
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
54. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) (steel producers sought
to enjoin the Secretary of Labor from determining wages for that industry under
an act which required parties under contract with the government to pay the
prevailing minimum wage; the Court held that damage or loss of income resulting from
governmental action was an invasion of recognized rights); Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (competition which electric
companies would suffer as a consequence of federally funded power program held
an insufficient interest to enable petititioners to sue to enjoin execution of power
contracts). See Young Americans for Freedom v. Rush, 205 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C.
1962), aft'd, 303 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Dillon,
335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
55. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
56. Id. at 99-100.
57. Id. at 102-03.
58. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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plaintiffs "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the con-
troversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.""9
Due to its definite first amendment associations, Flast has been
treated as an exceptional case and the reach of its holding has been
narrowly confined to its fact situation. The test enunciated in Flast
differs from the "zone of interests" test in that the taxpayers in Flast
were granted standing, not because they fell within a "zone of interests"
which the statute in question was designed to protect, but because a
specific constitutional provision, the establishment clause, gave them a
"clear stake" in preventing Congress from appropriating funds in
derogation of the first amendment.6 1 Subsequent decisions have used
the reasoning behind Flast's broad grant of standing as a starting
point, but generally have required for standing an additional showing
that the plaintiff was given the right under a particular statute to
challenge administrative action, or fell within the "zone of interests"
protected by that statute.6 '
The "zone of interests" test espoused in Data Processing was
used to determine whether the plaintiffs fell within the scope of the
section of the Administrative Procedure Act granting the right of
review to persons "adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning
of a relevant statute."62 By this section of the Act and by similar
provisions of other statutes, 63 increasing numbers of persons attempt-
ing to protect non-economic interests have been granted standing under
theories almost identical to that of the "zone of interests."'64 In Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,65 for example, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that an association of several
non-profit conservationist organizations and three New York towns
had standing to contest the granting of a license for the construction
of a power plant to Consolidated Edison of New York. The Conference
had claimed that it possessed a "recreational interest" in the preserva-
tion of the proposed construction site in its natural state and that it
thus came within the category of "parties aggrieved" entitled to chal-
lenge the granting of the license under the review provision of the
Federal Power Act.66 The Federal Power Act requires the Com-
mission when adopting a project plan to consider "beneficial public
uses, including recreational purposes. 6 7  The Court determined that
since the petitioners had exhibited special interests in the "aesthetic,
59. Id. at 204.
60. 392 U.S. at 105-06.
61. E.g., Data Processing Services, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
63. E.g., Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825c(b) (1964); FIFRA, 7 U.S.C.§ 135b(d) (1964).
64. Earlier courts granted standing to protect non-economic interests, but this
tendency has only accelerated in recent years. See National Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC (KOA), 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Henderson v. United States, 339
U.S. 816 (1950); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F. 2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
65. 354 F2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
66. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1964).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964).
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conservational and recreational aspects of power development," they
were "parties aggrieved."6 In the court's opinion, the statute created
new interests and rights and gave "standing to one who would other-
wise be barred by the lack of a 'case' or 'controversy.' "69 Although
the Second Circuit did not decide whether a lone individual would have
standing, it did exhibit a definite preference for litigation on behalf of
the public interest by organizations. It justified this preference for
organizations on the theory that the number of intervenors thus would
be limited and the administrative process expedited."0
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that organizations representing television viewers in a broadcast
area had standing to intervene in a proceeding for the renewal of a
station license. In Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC71 the petitioners urged the Federal Communications
Commission to deny a license because the station had not observed
the requirements of the fairness doctrine and had failed to operate in
the public interest. Judge Burger, writing for the court, rejected the
FCC's argument that only those alleging electrical interference or
economic injury had standing to intervene under section 309(d) of
the Federal Communications Act. 72 Instead, he recognized that stand-
ing served the practical function of allowing those (and only those)
with a legitimate interest 73 to participate in a proceeding. It should
be noted that the decision to grant standing in United Church of
Christ was influenced by extrinsic factors, primarily the Commission's
inability effectively to represent the listeners' interest in a renewal
proceeding. 74
The rule in United Church of Christ later was extended to allow
standing not only for organizations but for individual listeners as well.
The District of Columbia Circuit in Joseph v. FCC75 granted standing
to an individual or "a representative of the listening public."'76  In
this respect, United Church of Christ may foretell an eventual broaden-
ing of the Environmental Defense Fund holding: the individual "con-
sumer of the environment" may ultimately have standing to challenge
an order issued under FIFRA or under other similar acts.
As Professor K. C. Davis points out, the litigation concerning
the complexities of standing under a restrictive rule of standing may
be greater than the litigation which would occur if there were a rule
that granted everyone standing.77 Federal courts have been criticized
68. 354 F.2d at 616.
69. Id. at 615. See Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
70. 354 F.2d at 617.
71. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1964). This section provides that "parties in interest"
may challenge the issuance of a broadcasting license.
73. 359 F.2d at 1002. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio, 309 U.S. 470 (1939)
(economic injury); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (KOA), 132 F.2d 545 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) (electrical interference).
74. 359 F.2d at 1005. In this connection the court noted that the task of
maintaining surveillance would be extremely expensive as well as an enormous task.
75. 404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
76. Id. at 210.
77. E.g., K. Davis, The Liberalized Rule of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 450,
470 (1970).
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for using the theory of standing as a barrier to judicial review. Indefense of these courts, authorities have theorized that the adoption of
a strict view toward standing - the "legal interest" test - was moti-
vated by the desire to accomplish such purposes as the maintenance ofthe separation of powers, the encouragement of competent presentation
of cases, and the discouragement of litigation of baseless claims.7 8The most frequent argument against a liberalization of the federal
rule of standing is that easily satisfied standing requirements will cause
the proverbial floodgates of litigation to open, unreasonably burdening
the administrative agencies and crowding the court docket.
Associated Industries of New York, Inc. v. Ickes79 was among
the first cases to decide that a grant of standing would not have thelatter effect. There the Second Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out
that review procedures would limit the number of persons challenging
an order since, once a petition for review has been filed in any court
of appeals, no other court of appeals will review the same order on
an appeal subsequently filed."0 In Scenic Hudson"' the Second Circuit
also noted that the sheer expense of litigation prevents frivolous suitsfrom being filed, but suggested that standing be limited to organizations
representing common interests to expedite administrative and judicialprocesses.8 2 The District of Columbia Circuit apparently had, prior
to Environmental Defense Fund, also rejected the argument that moreflexible standing requirements would burden the court system. In
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer83 it declared:
The spectre of opening a Pandora's box of litigation has
always seemed groundless to us, particularly in the area of stand-ing to sue. Certainly the same hue and cry went up when the states
relaxed the criteria for standing to sue; but so far the dockets in
states have not increased appreciably as a result of new cases in
which standing would previously have been denied. 4
In Environmental Defense Fund the District of Columbia Circuit, bybroadly interpreting the "zone of interests" rule articulated in Data
Processing, may have taken one more step toward creating a more
rational doctrine of federal standing. 5 But even though the circuit hasfollowed the trend toward liberalizing the doctrine of standing, the
"zone of interests" test adhered to in Environmental Defense Fundhas been criticized as containing many of the defects of the "legalinterest" test.8 6 Justice Brennan, concurring in Barlow v. Collins,7
78. Id. at 469.
79. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
80. Id. at 707.
81. See note 65 supra.
82. 354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965).83. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
84. Id. at 872.85. Until recently, some states took a more liberal approach to standing than didthe federal courts. See, e.g., Currie v. Weld, 39 Minn. 426, 40 N.W. 561 (1888);Nichols v. Commissioner, 311 Mass. 125, 40 N.E.2d 275 (1942) ; Kuhn v. Curran,294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E.2d 513 (1945); Miller v. City of Pasco, 50 Wash. 2d 229,
310 P.2d 863 (1957).
86. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168 (1970) (Brennan & White, JJ.,concurring). It seems to be Justice Brennan's view that in order for a plaintiff
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argues that a true liberalization of standing would require that a
plaintiff need only allege that the contested act "has caused him injury
in fact, economic or otherwise""8 and that if a plaintiff fulfills this
requirement he has satisfied the "case" or "controversy" requirements
of article III of the Constitution; he then would have a personal stake
in the outcome. Justice Brennan would relegate any consideration of
the pertinent statute and its legislative history to the issue of whether
the action itself is judicially reviewable s 9 Another authority has
attacked the "zone of interests" test as necessitating a premature in-
quiry into legislative intent, frequently a time-consuming and futile
task. Moreover legislative history, even if adequately revealed, often
allows conflicting inferences. And in the case of many statutes, Con-
gress may not have considered at all the particular administrative
action being challenged. 90
The effect of Environmental Defense Fund on the federal law of
standing in other circuits is not presently clear. Basically, the District
of Columbia Circuit merely applied the rule established in Data Proc-
essing to a different factual scheme. Subsequent to the Environmental
Defense Fund decision, the Ninth Circuit denied standing to con-
servationist associations in two decisions: Sierra Club v. Hickel9 1 and
Alameda Conservation Association v. California.2 Both decisions con-
ceived of standing as necessitating a showing of injury to a legal
interest. The Sierra Club had instituted suit challenging both the
authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to approve a plan for the
commercial and recreational development of the Mineral King Valley in
Sequoia National Forest and the legality of the issuance of a highway
construction permit to the state of California by the Secretary of the
Interior. The Sierra Club claimed that the Secretary's act would
allow the permanent destruction of natural resources which would
constitute irreparable harm to the public interest. In the majority
opinion, Judge Trask declared that the plaintiff lacked standing be-
cause it had not established that the Secretary's action adversely
affected the organization; it had not alleged that any of the organiza-
tion's property would be damaged or that the organization would be
endangered or its status threatened.
In Alameda Conservation Association v. California, the plaintiff
association sought primarily to enjoin further proceedings to quiet
title to an exchange of lands between the state and the Leslie Salt
Company and to prevent the Leslie Salt Company from filling and
obstructing parts of the San Francisco Bay. Judge Trask, again
writing for the majority, held that citizens could not by uniting create
to show that he falls within the "zone of interests" protected by a statute, he has
to show that he had a "legal interest" which was infringed upon by action taken
pursuant to the statute.
87. Id.
88. 397 U.S. at 172.
89. Id. at 173.
90. K. Davis, The Liberalized Rule of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. Rav. 450, 463
(1970).
91. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub nom., Sierra Club v. Morton,
401 U.S. 907 (1971).
92. 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971).
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a "super-administrative agency" whose function is to contest "the
action of the appointed and elected officials" ;93 in the absence of injury
to the property interests of the association the association could not
obtain standing. The Ninth Circuit did grant standing to four
individual plaintiffs owning property bordering the Bay.
Of course, the holdings in Sierra Club and Alameda Conservation
Association possibly can be distinguished from that in Environmental
Defense Fund on the ground that in the former cases standing may
not have been claimed under an actual statute protecting an area in
which either club had an organizational interest; thus it is arguable
that neither plaintiff fell within an established zone of interests. But
it was the opinion of at least two of the judges in Alameda that peti-
tioner there did have standing under the two-pronged test in Data
Processing.4 And in both cases petitioners did allege injury to aesthetic,
conservational, and recreational interests, thereby meeting the "injury
in fact" test espoused by Justice Brennan in Barlow v. Collins."
The District of Columbia Circuit's liberal approach to standing
and the strict view of the Ninth Circuit may simply reflect a conflict
of theories of the role which the judiciary should play in reviewing
administrative orders. The Ninth Circuit's hesitation to intervene in
the administrative process and its deference to administrative discretion
pervades the two decisions. This reluctance is reminiscent of a similar
judicial deference which characterized the later New Deal era.9" The
District of Columbia Circuit, on the other hand, has evinced an in-
creasing willingness to intervene in matters traditionally reserved to
administrative discretion.97 This tendency is definitively manifested in
Environmental Defense Fund.
III. THE REVIEWABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY
SUSPENSION ORDER
Closely related to the issue of the plaintiff's standing in Environ-
mental Defense Fund is the question of whether the Secretary's failure
to issue suspension notices is reviewable. The doctrines of standing
and reviewability are functionally similar to the extent that courts
often employ both in judicially troublesome cases to avoid having to
reach a decision on the merits.9" Conversely, since the requirements
of standing have experienced a recent liberalization the courts have
likewise exhibited an increasing disposition toward finding administra-
tive actions reviewable. Professor Jaffe has designated this disposition
the "presumption of reviewability": "Congress, barring constitutional
impediments, may indeed exclude judicial review. But judicial review
is the rule. It rests on the congressional grant of general jurisdiction
93. Id. at 1090.
94. Id. at 1096. See also text accompanying note 47 supra.
95. See notes 86 and 88 supra and accompanying text.
96. JAFFE, supra note 37 at 343.
97. See note 160 infra and accompanying text.
98. Bickel, Foreword to The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961)
(passim). See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed
to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Saferstein].
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to the article III courts. It is a basic right; it is a traditional power
and the intention to exclude it must be made specifically manifest."9 9
In Environmental Defense Fund, the Secretary of Agriculture
attempted to rebut this presumption by arguing that the non-issuance
of suspension notices'00 was protected from judicial review by an
exception contained in section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
precluding review of "agency action... committed to agency discretion
by law."'' The Secretary's argument that issuance was discretionary
was based upon the use of permissive language in section 4(c) of
FIFRA which provides that "the Secretary may . . . suspend the
registration" ;102 the use of such terminology, the Secretary contended,
operated to commit the action to agency discretion.
The court ruled that the presumption of reviewability controlled
and that the presumption had not been rebutted by a showing that a
decision as to whether to grant the emergency suspension order was
one "committed to agency discretion by law.' 01 3 This decision rested
primarily on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Barlow v. Collins."'
In that case, tenant farmers contested the Secretary of Agriculture's
regulation for the upland cotton program'0 5 which permitted partici-
pants in the program to assign to creditor-landowners their rights to
government payments only when such assignment was made "as
security for cash or advances to finance making a crop."'0° In 1966,
the Secretary had amended the regulation to include cash rent pay-
ments for land used for agricultural purposes within the definition of
"making a crop,"1 7 an action which allegedly jeopardized the welfare
of the tenant farmers.'0 8 The Supreme Court held that the Secretary's
decision to amend the regulation was reviewable despite the statutory
provision which authorized the Secretary to "prescribe such regula-
tions, as he may deem proper. . . ,"' In the majority opinion, Justice
Douglas stated that the use of a permissive term alone in a statute
does not indicate a Congressional intent to preclude review; 0 since
the statute itself did not explicitly disallow review and since non-re-
99. JAFFE, supra note 37 at 346. For an excellent discussion of the presumptive
right of judicial review, see JAFFE at 336-51. Cf. Saferstein, supra note 98 at 370.
100. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) (Supp. V, 1969).
102. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964).
103. 428 F.2d at 1098. See also Littell v. Morton, 40 U.S.L.W. 2086 (4th Cir.
1971).
104. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
105. The upland cotton program was created by the Food and Agricultural Act
of 1965, 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (Supp. V, 1969) and incorporates programs under the
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 16 U.S.C. § 590(z) (1964).
106. 16 U.S.C. 590h(g) (1964) (emphasis added).
107. 32 FED. REG. 14921 (1967), 7 C.F.R. § 709.3 (1969).
108. In Barlow the tenant farmers alleged that the amended regulations caused
them to suffer irreparable harm since the landlord could demand that they assign
to him the benefits of the program in advance as a condition to his granting them
a lease to farm the land. This would prevent them from forming co-operatives to
finance the purchase of tools, seed, groceries, etc. 397 U.S. at 162-63.
109. 16 U.S.C. § 590d(3) (1964) (emphasis added).
110. 397 U.S. at 166.
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viewability could not be inferred from the purpose of the statute,"'
the Secretary's action could not have been intended to be discretionary.
The prevailing presumption of reviewability has some disadvan-
tages. As Harvey Saferstein points out, a rule that permits the
courts to review every allegation of capriciousness or irrationality is
fraught with potential for encumbering the judiciary with time-con-
suming and frivolous claims as well as interrupting administrative and
congressional programs." 2 Courts will be forced to spend many hours
analyzing agency functions to determine whether an administrative
action is capricious. Although this problem is not unduly disturbing
in the Environmental Defense Fund situation, where the dangers of
DDT are scientifically documented and are shown to affect everyone,
in other cases lengthy review could result in increased protection of a
minority at the expense of the essential needs of a majority. This risk
is present, of course, in any judicial system which allows the public
easy access to the courts.
IV. THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE
The pragmatic treatment of ripeness in Environmental Defense
Fund may constitute a precedent, particularly influencing the manner
in which environmental suits are initiated. The most perplexing ques-
tion in Environmental Defense Fund was whether the Department's
letter to the petitioner's attorney constituted an "order" which was
ripe for review under FIFRA."5 The letter merely informed the peti-
tioners that the Secretary had issued notices of cancellation for some
uses of DDT and was contemplating the cancellation of the remaining
uses as well as the issuance of suspension orders." 4
Ripeness or finality is a concept which, while not conducive to
definition, basically requires that reviewability be conditioned upon a
finding of the existence of a judicial controversy between the parties.""
The notion of ripeness frequently is used so as to encompass areas
such as standing and reviewability since these two concepts also relate
to the justiciability of an issue. However, ripeness may be distinguished
from standing and reviewability in that ripeness focuses simultaneously
on the "fitness of the issues for judicial decision" and on the hardship
which would be suffered by the plaintiff if the matter were to be
allowed to stand unreviewed." 6 The essence of ripeness lies in its
function; in Abbott Laboratories Justice Harlan described this function
in the following manner:
... its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance
of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
111. The inference of non-reviewability from the purpose of a statute is called
"implicit preclusion." See, e.g., Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320
U.S. 297 (1943).
112. Saferstein, supra note 98, at 375.
113. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1964).
114. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
115. JAFFE, supra note 37, at 395.116. 387 U.S. at 149 (1967). For a criticism of the Court's definition of ripenessin terms of a "twofold aspect," see DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 673 (1970 Supp.).
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disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision
has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the
challenging parties." 7
The concept of ripeness was derived from the construction of statutes
relating to the procedure for obtaining judicial review of an admin-
istrative action. For example, ripeness was initially developed in
litigation under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, which permitted a district
court to set aside any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
but which failed to define "any order.""' 8
The Secretary argued in Environmental Defense Fund that there
was no order which was ripe for review because the statute permitted
review of only a final order, which, the Secretary argued, can only
be an order issued after all administrative proceedings have been
completed." 9 The correctness of this argument was an issue of first
impression and stemmed from the ambiguities of FIFRA. Subsection
4 (c) succinctly provides that "[f] inal orders of the Secretary under this
section shall be subject to judicial review, in accordance with the pro-
visions of subsection (d) .... -120 Other provisions of subsection 4(c)
could be interpreted as defining a final order as one issued by the Secre-
tary on the basis of a record, i.e., on completion of all administrative
proceedings. Subsection 4(d), however, grants a right of review of
"any order.' 1 2 ' This ambiguity suggests that there could be no clear
legislative intent to preclude review of an interim order, that is, one
issued before the termination of administrative proceedings. Neverthe-
less, the Secretary contended that these two subsections, when read
together, allowed judicial review only after the completion of adminis-
trative procedures. 22 His argument was bolstered by a consideration
of the practicalities of review which demand that an appellate court
have a record upon which to base its decision ;123 the record usually
contains findings of facts by the agency and/or the record of an ad-
ministrative hearing. In addition, the legislative history of both the
Administrative Procedure Act and FIFRA suggest that judicial review
was to be on the basis of a formal hearing record.' 24 The Secretary
also claimed that the letter to E.D.F.'s attorney did not otherwise have
the attributes of a final order; it did not "impose any obligationi, deny
117. 387 U.S. at 148-49.
118. This act is codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1336, 2284, 2321-25 (1964).
119. This argument has been advanced in other cases. E.g., Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) ; Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51(D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954) ; Medical Comm. for Human
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
120. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1964).
121. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1964).
122. Respondent's Brief at 15-16.
123. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943), wherein it was
held that judicial review must involve the examination of an administrative record.
See also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
124. See Statement of Rep. Walter, 92 CONG. Rc. 5654 (1946) ; S. REP. No. 573,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963).
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any right, or fix any legal relationship as a consummation of the ad-
ministrative process." '125
The District of Columbia Circuit took a realistic approach toward
the issue of whether the Secretary's order, which neither granted nor
denied E.D.F.'s request, was ripe for review. They employed a prag-
matic test, characteristic of the approach taken in a strong line of cases;
the courts in these cases had decided that ripeness reflects, not the
formal trappings of an order, but rather its effects upon the parties.
For example, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States1 26
a broadcasting network challenged the promulgation by the FCC of
regulations providing that a broadcasting station's license would not
be renewed if its contract with a network violated certain regulations.'
The government argued that there was no order ripe for review since
the rights of CBS would be affected only if the agency decided to take
further action. The Supreme Court, however, held that CBS was
entitled to judicial review of the regulations since its business was
dependent on the continuation of broadcasting station contracts; the
mere threat of cancellation would cause it great injury. The Court
ruled that any decision concerning ripeness hinges on the necessity
of protecting a party from "irreparable injury threatened in the ex-
ceptional case by administrative rulings which attach legal consequences
to action taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications that
may follow .... ,,128
Subsequent cases interpreting Columbia Broadcasting have held
that an order's finality is not contingent upon a statutorily prescribed
hearing having been held or upon the order's having been the last
to be issued. This interpretation seems logical in view of the fact
that many administrative orders, issued after only informal information-
gathering proceedings, may nevertheless create a judicial controversy
between the parties ripe for judicial review. 129 In Isbrandtsen Co. v.
United States130 the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Federal
Maritime Board's refusal to hold a requested hearing prior to the
initiation of a dual-rate schedule was reviewable as a final order. The
Isbrandtsen decision was based almost entirely on the fact that peti-
tioners would suffer economic injury if the denial were sustained
despite the fact that hearings could be held after the dual-rate schedule
was approved. Judge Bazelon, writing for the court, declared that
125. Respondent's Brief at 18. For authority, respondents relied on Chicago &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103 (1948);
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F. 2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990(1954). See Mustain v. United States, 314 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1963), where a
letter sent by the Department of Agriculture to petitioners threatening to invoke
the provisions of the Hobbs Act, which requires licensing of perishable agricultural
commodities, was denied review.
126. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
127. CBS tried to establish that the FCC's action constituted an order under§ 402(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1964) and the
Urgent Deficiencies Act, 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1964).
128. 316 U.S. at 425. It is interesting to note that the Court referred to this
formula as the ultimate test of reviewability, a symptom of the semantic problems
surrounding ripeness. See JAFrE, supra note 37, at 402.
129. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 668 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
130. 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
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"[t]he Board's action was just as determinative of Isbrandtsen's
rights as it would have been had the Board specifically and affirmatively
approved the dual rate system .... ""' Other courts have made the
finality of an order dependent upon the availability of adequate admin-
istrative remedies,k32 although this question is usually considered in
the context of exhaustion of administrative remedies.13 3 In Cities
Service Gas Co. v. FPC34 the Tenth Circuit held that a natural gas
purchaser could obtain immediate judicial review of the FPC's accept-
ance of a rate schedule which had been declared invalid by the Supreme
Court subsequent to filing. Since the invalid rate had been initially
imposed on the gas company without an opportunity to challenge it,
the petitioner did not have the burden of persuading the FPC to in-
validate it. This administrative avenue was open to him under section
5(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 13
Relying on theories similar to those set forth above, the Environ-
mental Defense Fund court found that the Secretary's inaction on the
suspension and cancellation orders constituted an order ripe for review.
Its finding was the result of its consideration of two factors: (1) the
absence of further available agency proceedings that could sharpen the
controversy' 36 and (2) the allegation that further delay would result in
"irreparable injury"1 7 due to the imminent dangers of DDT.
The Environmental Defense Fund court closely examined the
issue of whether the Secretary's inaction on the requests for an
emergency suspension order and for cancellation of the remaining uses
of DDT was an order denying relief and was, consequently, reviewable.
Although Judge Bazelon included this discussion under the topic head-
ing of ripeness, many authorities have considered the question of the
reviewability of an interim order to be more closely related to the
concept of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 138 Under this doc-
trine a party must exhaust the available administrative remedies before
he may obtain judicial review, unless the party can prove that any
administrative remedy which is available would not give sufficient
relief, e.g., will not prevent irreparable injury. 139 The Administrative
Procedure Act has incorporated this exception to the requirement of
exhaustion and has imposed a corresponding duty upon each agency
to decide any matter before it within a reasonable time. 4 ° The agency's
obligation to perform this duty may be enforced through section 10(e),
which authorizes courts to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld
131. Id. at 56.
132. Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1958) ; Deering
Milliken v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1962).
133. See note 138 infra and accompanying text.
134. 255 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1958).
135. Section 5(d) of the APA provides: "The agency is authorized in its sound
discretion . . . to issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove
uncertainty." 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1964).
136. 428 F.2d at 1098.
137. Id. at 1099.
138. JAFFE, supra note 37, at 426; 3 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 97 (1958).
139. JAFFE, supra note 37, at 428.
140. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (Supp. V, 1969).
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or unreasonably delayed . . ,141 Congressional reports have indi-
cated and judicial precedents have concluded that one purpose of the
inclusion of this section in the Act is to prevent agencies from denying
relief through inaction or dilatory proceedings. 142
From a conceptual point of view this exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies may validly be considered to
reflect an aspect of ripeness. Agency action "unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed" can be said to create a controversy between
the agency and the complaining party which is ripe for judicial review.
The remedy utilized by the courts in most cases where unreasonable
delay has been found has been to order the agency itself to act. (In
this respect Environmental Defense Fund is unusual because the in-
quiry there was whether unreasonable delay made inaction equivalent
to a denial by the agency, i.e., equivalent to negative action by the
agency, and thus made the agency's decision itself ripe for review.)
Typical circumstances under which an agency can be compelled
to act were described in Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston.1 4 3 There,
a textile manufacturer sought to enjoin the National Labor Relations
Board from holding a rehearing scheduled after costly and prolonged
administrative proceedings. The Fourth Circuit held that the district
court could review the Board's decision to remand to the trial exam-
iner, could order the Board to expedite the matter before it, and
could force the Board to restrict the scope of the rehearing to allow
only the receipt of newly discovered evidence. Administrative pro-
ceedings had been pending for nearly five years, causing the manu-
facturer to incur enormous litigation expenses in derogation of its
right to reasonable expedition. Since the National Labor Relations
Act failed to provide an adequate remedy for plaintiff's injury,'44 the
court held that the manufacturer did not have to exhaust the admin-
istrative remedies provided it by the statute. 45
As the Environmental Defense Fund opinion noted, 46 courts are
usually reluctant to intervene, prior to the completion of the admin-
istrative process, to compel an agency to act. Often it is difficult to
determine whether action has been unreasonably delayed due to the
complexity of the administrative process; frequent judicial scrutiny
may wreak havoc with the regulatory functions. For these reasons,
section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act generally has
been invoked by a court only when the complaining party has shown
an irrational basis for the delay. 47 For example, in Deering Milliken
the Board's remand order was unreasonable since it did not limit
the scope of the hearing to the receipt of newly discovered evidence
141. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (Supp. V, 1969). See Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston,
295 F. 2d 856, 863 (4th Cir. 1961).
142. Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 204-05, 263-64 (1946) ; Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d
856 (4th Cir. 1961).
143. 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
144. Section 10(f) of the National Labor Relations Act provides for review of
orders granting or denying relief only. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964).
145. 295 F.2d at 866.
146. 428 F.2d at 1099.
147. Kessler v. FCC, 326 F. 2d 673, 684 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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but allowed the discussion of issues already extensively and properly
considered in previous hearings. A showing of lengthy delay may
not by itself be sufficient to establish a violation of section 10(e). The
District of Columbia Circuit declared in Harvey Radio Laboratories,
Inc. v. United States,148 that the agency's delay in that matter was
reasonable and refused to invoke section 10(e) even though the
petitioner's application for a radio license had been held in abeyance
for ten years. Recognizing that the judiciary cannot direct by fiat the
order in which the Commission shall consider its applications, the
Harvey Radio court reasoned that enforced agency consideration of
petitioner's application might render futile FCC rule-making proceed-
ings which contemplated a realignment of radio stations.
On the strength of these decisions, the Environmental Defense
Fund court held that judicial review was proper because the agency's
inaction on the emergency suspension order was unreasonable and
was equivalent to an agency order denying relief. The Secretary had
a statutory obligation to issue the suspension order as soon as possible
if the alleged peril existed since even temporary delay might cause
petitioner and the public great injury and, thus, the order operated
with final effect on petitioners and was ripe for review. On the other
hand, the court was hesitant to decide that delay in issuing the re-
quested cancellation orders was a denial since the Secretary had in
fact issued cancellation notices on four uses of DDT, and since addi-
tional study of the remaining uses was in progress, rendering judicial
review inauspicious at that time.
The court nevertheless questioned whether FIFRA authorized
the Secretary to invite public comment, to be made prior to the issuance
of cancellation notices, on the advisability of eliminating the use of
DDT.149 FIFRA does not contemplate this procedure but relegates
the receipt of any public comment to the administrative hearings which
are available once notices of cancellation have been issued. 15 0 By re-
ferring to the Report of the House Committee on Government Opera-
tion, which is highly critical of the administration of FIFRA, the
court pointed to one more example of the administrative misfeasance
surrounding the Environmental Defense Fund case.'
In deciding that a letter responding to a citizen's request for
administrative action may be a reviewable final order, Environmental
Defense Fund may have a great impact on administrative law. Even
when confined to its facts the decision suggests the possibility that a
citizen or a group of citizens with a demonstrable interest in environ-
mental control can, by letter, request the Secretary to take a certain
action and have access to judicial review if the Secretary either denies
the petition or does nothing. Indeed, in the subsequent case of
Wellford v. Ruckelshaus'5 2 the District of Columbia Circuit assumed
without comment that the denial by the Pesticide Regulation Division
148. 289 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Cf. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v.
Donovan, 274 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1960).
149. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
150. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
151. 428 F.2d at 1100. See note 163 infra and accompanying text.
152. Wellford v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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of the Department of Agriculture of a petition requesting suspension
of 2, 4, 5-T, a pesticide, was ripe for review. However, the accuracy
of any prediction of the impact of Environmental Defense Fund hinges
on a reconciliation of that case with Nor-Am Agricultural Products,
Inc. v. Hardin.'" In Nor-Am a manufacturer sought to enjoin the
enforcement of an emergency order suspending the registration of
panogen, a mercury compound, which order had been issued following
a tragic accident receiving national publicity. Three farm children were
hospitalized for mercury poisoning after eating meat from a hog that
had been fed seed contaminated with a fungicide containing mercury.
The Seventh Circuit held that the emergency order would not be
ripe for review until after the required statutory hearings on the
accompanying cancellation notices had been completed. The court
reasoned that if judicial review of the interim order were available
then the expedited hearings would be futile, litigation would be pro-
longed, and government efforts to protect the public would be frus-
trated. The Nor-Am court attempted to reconcile its decision with
that in Environmental Defense Fund on the theory that in the latter
case there were no further administrative remedies for the denial of a
request for an emergency suspension order because no hearings could
be held on the issue of the denial.
The District of Columbia Circuit on subsequent rehearing of the
principal case in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus5 4
rejected the validity of this distinction. 55 First of all, the Ruckelshaus
court contended that there was no clear evidence of legislative intent
to limit review to emergency suspension orders issued on completion
of administrative hearings. Indeed, the court pointed out that many
persons who could not initiate a hearing under FIFRA are nonethe-
less entitled to judicial review. For example, if a manufacturer ac-
knowledges that a cancellation order would be proper but asserts
that an emergency suspension order would not be, the statute would
not require a hearing on his complaint even though judicial review
would be available. 56 Moreover, the court declared that it could not
accept the distinction made by Nor-Am between the ripeness of an
order imposing a suspension and that of an order denying it. In
either instance administrative proceedings may be available. FIFRA
envisions that expedited proceedings may be held if a suspension is
ordered and that hearings may also be held after the issuance of
cancellation notices if a request for a suspension notice is denied. Of
course, the hearings following the issuance of cancellation notices
would not concern the propriety of the refusal to suspend registration,
such issue having become moot by the time the hearings are held.
Consequently, the District of Columbia Circuit in Ruckelshaus de-
clared that it is necessary merely to "consider whether the impact of
the order is sufficiently 'final' to warrant review in the context of
153. 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. dismissed pursuant to Rule
60, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
154. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
155. Id. at 591.
156. Id.
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the particular case.' ' 1 57 If the latter interpretation of FIFRA is
accepted, judicial review of emergency suspension orders will not
hinge on the completion of statutorily required proceedings but rather
upon the ripeness of an administrative order.
The ultimate effect on administrative law of Environmental De-
fense Fund's treatment of ripeness may be weakened by two other
factors. First, the fact that blatant administrative inefficiency was
prominent among the circumstances of the case may lead subsequent
courts to give the decision less credibility. There may be a tendency
to feel that the District of Columbia Circuit would have been less
anxious to jump the hurdles - ripeness, reviewability and standing -
in the way of allowing judicial review if the Department of Agriculture
had fulfilled its obligations under FIFRA to a greater extent. Second,
subsequent courts might conclude that the District of Columbia Circuit
would have employed similar restraint if the issue had not involved
a product as deleterious to the environment as DDT. A suspicion that
these two factors had a substantial impact on the decision is reinforced
by the absence of thorough development of the reasoning behind the
complex legal theorems laid down in the decision.
V. THE EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE INEFFICIENCY
The District of Columbia Circuit's seeming distrust of the ability
of federal agencies to function in the public interest pervades the entire
decision in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin. Although
many courts which have held an administrative action reviewable have
indicated that the administrative agency had not conducted the matter
in accordance with the requirements of the particular statute involved,158
the District of Columbia Circuit has been the most critical.'5 9
The impact of general administrative mismanagement on a decision
to review can be seen in a recent case, Medical Committee for Human
Rights v. Securities and Exchange Commission.' Here, the Dow
Chemical Company had intentionally failed to include the Medical Com-
mittee's resolution in its proxy statement. Dow justified this omission
on the theory that the resolution contained materials motivated by
general political and moral concerns and that therefore the regulations
governing the solicitation of proxies did not require its inclusion.'
When the SEC refused to object to this omission the Medical Com-
mittee appealed the refusal to the District of Columbia Circuit Court.
The court's decision to review this discretionary "no-action" order
was admittedly prompted, at least in part, by several non-legal con-
siderations. The court noted in particular that the SEC was advocating
a position identical to that of the company which it was supposed to
regulate, that the SEC had been accused of violating its own pro-
157. Id.
158. E.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856
(4th Cir. 1961); Isbrandtsen Co. v. U.S., 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 990 (1954).
159. JAFFE, supra note 37, at 521.
160. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
161. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1971).
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cedural principles relating to management's burden of proof in justi-fying the omission of materials from proxy statements, and that its pastdecisions concerning such omissions lacked an articulated rationale. 62
The incompetency of the administration of FIFRA by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, notorious at the time of the Environmental Defense
Fund decision, may have likewise played a role in the court's decisionto review the Secretary's inaction. In November, 1969, the HouseCommittee on Government Operations had publicly revealed that
"[u]ntil mid-1967, the USDA Pesticides Regulation Division failed
almost completely to carry out its responsibility to enforce provisions ofthe Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act intended toprotect the public from hazardous and ineffective pesticide productsbeing marketed in violation of the act."'16 3 The Committee found that,
although the enforcement procedure of the Pesticides Regulation Divi-
sion (PRD) had improved since 1967, PRD had never secured cancella-tion of the registration of any product and had issued only one suspen-
sion. The Committee's investigation disclosed that PRD had abandoned
action whenever a manufacturer who had received a cancellation notice
requested a hearing.16 4
The Committee's investigation also showed that some products,
such as thallium sulfate (a rat poison), bore confusing and contradictorylabelling. 165  They discovered that since the section 4(c) procedureshad been established, PRD had allowed the registration of more than1,600 products over the objection of the Public Health Service, adivision of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Whenthe Department had objected, PRD had demanded that the Depart-
ment supply scientific proof of the existence of imminent danger tothe public rather than place the burden of showing the product's
safety upon the manufacturer. PRD also was shown to have registeredpesticides for uses which it knew were certain to cause adulteration. 166
The Committee noted that a few individuals employed by PRD were
employees of the Shell Chemical Company; one member of a seven-
man task force, appointed in July, 1965, to study procedures used byPRD for determining the safety of pesticides, was concurrently an
employee of Shell, one of the largest producers of pesticides, 67 while
another person who was a medical consultant to Shell also served
as a consultant to PRD from May, 1963, to June, 1969.168
This Congressional report, plus the Mrak Report 69 published in
162. Id. at 674.163. House Committee on Government Operation, Deficiencies in Administrationof Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, H.R. REP. No. 268, 91stCong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969). For a further discussion of the inefficiency of theDepartment of Agriculture, see The Real Villians, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 31, 1970,
at 17-20.
164. H.R. REP. No. 268, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).165. Id. at 7. This labelling for thallium sulfate cautioned that the productshould be kept out of the reach of children, but the product was used on floors,within easy reach of children. FIFRA envisions that economic poisons be labelledto ensure safe use. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
166. Id. at 14.167. Id. at 9-10. This member's personnel clearance noted that he did not haveany financial interest in a firm which might constitute a conflict of interest.
168. Id. at 11.
169. See note 29 supra.
1971]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
November, 1969, revealed strong evidence that the Secretary had not
complied with the provisions of FIFRA which dictate that economic
poisons be properly labelled, that products hazardous to the public
be taken off the market, and that the manufacturer bear the burden
of proof of the product's safety. 7 °
After studying the effects of DDT on the environment the Mrak
Report had recommended that the government "eliminate within two
years all uses of DDT . . . in the United States except those uses
essential to the preservation of human health.' 1 7 ' The Mrak Com-
mission reported that DDT had been proven to cause cancer, 172 was
persistent in the environment, 1 3 and contaminated human tissue,174
human food, and even those items not treated with DDT. 75 In addi-
tion, DDT was found to cause irreparable harm to such diverse ele-
ments as air, rainwater, sea birds, antarctic animals, cosmetics and
human milk. 76 The Mrak Report, consequently, furnished the court
with substantial evidence that the Secretary had not been fulfilling
his obligations under FIFRA. The District of Columbia Circuit may
have silently decided that this case was one that required judicial
supervision. 77
VI. CONCLUSION
The liberalized rules of standing, reviewability and ripeness de-
veloped in Environmental Defense Fund will undoubtedly contribute
to an increase in the number of petitions for judicial review of admin-
istrative action, 17 by enabling the citizen to clear the threshold barriers
to review and to present the merits of the case.
The manner in which Environmental Defense Fund was initiated
is, of course, instructive by way of example. Interpreted narrowly, it
means that "consumers of the environment" have standing to contest
orders issued under FIFRA and can petition the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency 7 to take a particular action and
obtain judicial review if he refuses to act. Any broader reading is
fraught with difficulties in that Sierra Club v. Hickel, Alameda Con-
servation Association v. California, and Nor-Am v. Hardin have
clouded the meaning of Environmental Defense Fund. The absence
170. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
171. H.R. REP. No. 268, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
172. Id. at 470-72, 481-83.
173. Id. at 103-04.
174. Id. at 321-41.
175. Id. at 136-40.
176. Id. at 114, 213.
177. Some cases have openly acknowledged that occasionally judicial supervision
is needed to fulfill the legislative intent prescribing an agency's function. See, e.g.,
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 674 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
178. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
179. See note 11 supra.
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of discussion of the legal basis for the sweeping rules set down by the
court also may affect its value as precedent.
Future litigants will be well-advised to note the diverse, non-legal
factors behind the court's decision: the proven inefficiency of the
Pesticide Regulation Division, congressional demand for more effective
administration of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, well-documented evidence showing DDT to be an "imminent
hazard" to health and to the environment, and the haphazard manner
in which the Department of Agriculture handled the petition. These
considerations, plus a judicial suspicion that administrative agencies
may not be fulfilling their public responsibilities, subliminally influenced
the District of Columbia Circuit Court's decision. On a larger scale
the decision in Environmental Defense Fund may be indicative of a
growing awareness that administrative agencies are not the model
governing bodies which their creators envisioned.'
180. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
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